The Fifth Day
In 2023 Portugal asked a few dozen firms to work four days for the pay of five, and most of them liked it. Three years later the government has let the experiment lapse, parliament has voted down every attempt to extend it, and the follow-up survey was never published. The evidence from abroad says that most of the gains last a year, some firms quietly give up, and nobody has yet measured whether a shorter week changes what people think their job is for.
The first part of The Duty to Work ended with a list of open threads, and the last of them was the four-day week. Portugal’s 2023 pilot, it said, had found frequent exhaustion down by a third and most firms keeping the shorter week; what happened to those firms since, and to their workers’ sense of what their job is for, was “the natural next measurement”.
This essay follows that thread. It asks three things. What the Portuguese pilot actually showed, read more carefully than the headlines allowed. What has happened since, in Portugal and in the other countries that ran trials, and whether the gains last once the researchers leave. And whether working less changes the place of the job in a life, which is the question the essay on the duty to work cared about most. The answer to the last one is short and unsatisfying: nobody has measured it. What can be said is assembled here from the edges.
This is an assessment, not a case for or against. The four-day week has enthusiastic advocates, and much of the evidence is produced by them; it also has critics who dismiss it without looking at the evidence at all. Both are easier than reading the reports.
A proof of concept, with a comparison group
The pilot was designed by two economists, Pedro Gomes of Birkbeck and Rita Fontinha of Henley Business School, and run by the public employment service, IEFP, for the government of António Costa. Private firms were invited to cut hours without cutting pay for six months, from June 2023, with no subsidy. Twenty-one firms took the trial, and twenty that already worked four days joined the study; together they employed more than a thousand people. In the trial firms the average working week fell from 41.6 to 36.5 hours.[1] The results, and the fact that most firms kept the new schedule, were reported in The Two-Thirds Country.
The feature the authors were proudest of was methodological. Unlike the British and American pilots, this one had a comparison group: workers in thirteen firms that had registered interest but did not go ahead, plus thirty workers in one participating firm who kept the old schedule. That matters, because every before-and-after study of a working-time change runs into the same problem. The first survey is taken in May, the second in November; people are more or less tired for reasons that have nothing to do with the policy. A comparison group lets you subtract the season.
It was a modest comparison group. It was not chosen at random, and the report says so. Only 75 of its workers answered both surveys, against 225 in the pilot firms, and it was used only for the worker surveys: for the firms’ revenue and profits there was no comparison at all, and the authors write that any change in them “cannot have a causal interpretation”. The results are mostly presented as two before-and-after comparisons side by side rather than as a formal estimate of the difference.[1]
Read that way, the headline changes. Figure 1 shows seven of the worker measures. In every one the pilot firms improved more than the comparison group. But the comparison group improved on several of them too. The share of workers who felt exhausted because of work at least half the time fell from about 38 to about 24 per cent in the pilot firms, 15 points, which is the “down by a third” of the earlier essay. In the comparison group it fell 9 points. The difference that the four-day week can claim is about 6 points, not 15. The widely quoted “exhaustion down 19 per cent”, repeated by the international campaign and by members of parliament in the debate of December 2025, is different again: it comes from the three-month interim report, is an index rather than a share of workers, and has no comparison group at all.[1]
Some measures survive the subtraction much better than that. Tiredness at the end of the working day fell 24 points against 13. Fatigue fell 22 points in the pilot and rose slightly in the comparison group. The share of workers who said their mental health was very good or excellent doubled, from 15 to 30 per cent, while in the comparison group it fell from 26 to 17. The share who had enough energy left for family and friends rose 19 points, against none. Where the pilot shows a clear effect, it is on what workers have left over at the end of the day and the end of the week.[1]
On the business side the evidence is softer. The final report’s summary says that “almost 80 per cent” of managers judged the trial financially neutral; the body of the report, with 33 firms answering, gives 75 per cent neutral, 17 per cent a little costly and 7 per cent advantageous, with none very costly. These are managers’ judgements, not accounts. Workers, for their part, put a price on the four-day week: asked what pay rise would compensate them for losing it, they valued it at 28 per cent of their salary, for a cut in hours of 12 per cent.[1]
The comparison group improved too. The difference the four-day week can claim on exhaustion is about 6 points, not 15.Gomes & Fontinha, Relatório Final, 2024, Fig. 3.17
None of this makes the pilot a failure. It makes it what its authors called it, a proof of concept: a demonstration that Portuguese firms of different kinds could reorganise to work four days without visible harm, and that their workers were, by every measure asked, better off at the end of the week. It is not an estimate of what would happen if a law imposed the same thing on firms that did not volunteer.
Three years on
By March 2024, of the twenty-one trial firms, twelve had kept a four-day week in the same or another format, five had scaled it back, for example to the summer months only, and four had gone back to five days. Of the twenty firms that had already worked four days, half had made it permanent and seven were still testing it. The report found one pattern in who stayed: firms that had reorganised their work in two or more ways reverted in 8 per cent of cases, those that changed one thing or nothing in 38 per cent.[1]
After that the public record thins out. The report announced a survey of workers twelve months after the start, for June 2024. No results of it have been published. No peer-reviewed paper on the pilot has appeared either; the authors’ only journal item since is a short correspondence in Nature Human Behaviour on how a four-day week might affect health.[2] The most recent number is a remark by Gomes, in an interview in August 2026, that “more than 50 per cent” of the pilot’s participants still work four days and that new firms are joining, without saying fifty per cent of what.[3] A research project at the University of Porto’s Institute of Sociology, funded from February 2025 to August 2026 with the pilot’s designers as partners, set out to follow seventeen of the firms that continued as longitudinal case studies. It has not yet published.[4] The four firms that went back have never been named.
The politics moved faster than the research. The Costa government that commissioned the pilot fell, and the Democratic Alliance government that took office in April 2024 did not run a second wave. At the presentation of the final results in June 2024 the Labour Minister, Maria do Rosário Palma Ramalho, said it was “early”, that regulation was “still far off”, and that nothing would be regulated without the social partners; she also warned of effects on the division of care between men and women.[5] The Prime Minister floated a four-day week in the public administration without a cut in weekly hours, which is compression rather than reduction; no national public-sector pilot followed. In October 2024 the congress of the governing PSD approved a motion from its youth wing calling for a gradual four-day week.[5]
On 5 December 2025 parliament voted on five proposals: from Livre, a programme for a four-day week in the private and public sectors; from the Left Bloc and the Socialists, resolutions to extend the pilot; from the Left Bloc and PAN, bills to reduce the maximum working week towards 35 hours. All were rejected. PSD, Chega, the Liberal Initiative and CDS voted against the four-day resolutions, with one PSD deputy, the leader of the party’s youth wing, voting in favour. Two resolutions on work–life balance and incentives for family-friendly firms were approved instead.[6] The government’s own labour reform, Trabalho XXI, contained an individual hours bank but nothing on the four-day or compressed week; it was rejected on its general vote in June 2026.[7]
The one new experiment came from the Azores. The regional government ran a pilot in its public administration from January to June 2026, with thirteen services and about 380 workers moving from 35 to 32 hours, and with Gomes and Fontinha as advisers. Only three workers withdrew, and the regional secretary said it had run “with complete normality”. The report was promised for September; it has not yet appeared.[8] The appetite, where it has been measured, is large but not representative: in a 2023 survey of more than fourteen thousand civil servants, 85 per cent agreed with a four-day week without loss of pay and 3 per cent disagreed.[9] There is no representative national poll on the question.
So the honest summary of what happened to the Portuguese firms since is this: most of them seem to have kept some form of shorter week, nobody has published a count, and the state that started the experiment has stopped paying attention to it. To see whether the gains last, one has to look abroad.
Does it last?
The largest body of evidence comes from the pilots coordinated by the campaign group 4 Day Week Global and analysed by researchers at Boston College, Cambridge and elsewhere. The best known is the British pilot of 2022: 61 firms and about 2,900 employees, six months, no loss of pay, no comparison group. At the end, 56 firms were continuing.[10] A year later, at least 54 of the 61 still had the policy, 5 had dropped it and 2 did not reply; at least 31 had made it permanent.[11]
The researchers pooled these and other trials into the most thorough published study, in Nature Human Behaviour in 2025: 2,896 employees in 141 organisations in six countries, with burnout, job satisfaction and mental and physical health all improving over six months, a pattern not found in twelve comparison companies. The comparison companies were added during peer review, at a reviewer’s request; they were firms that attended an information session and did not join, about a tenth of the sample, surveyed later than most. The authors write that their results “likely overestimate the average true effect”, because the firms chose to take part. The most interesting finding is internal: the improvement tracked how much each worker’s own hours fell, not how much the company’s nominal hours did, and it ran through better sleep, less fatigue and a greater sense of being able to do the job.[12]
The question of whether the gains last can be answered, partially, for firms that kept the policy. Figure 2 shows how much of each improvement measured at six months was still there at twelve, in the British pilot and in the larger pooled data. Burnout, sleep, fatigue, mental and physical health and life satisfaction held, and some kept improving. Two measures faded. Work ability kept about 60 per cent of its gain. Job satisfaction kept about half: 52 per cent in the pooled data, 62 per cent in the British. The authors describe this as slight evidence of “hedonic adaptation” in job satisfaction only.[11][12]
The limitation is built into the design. The twelve-month numbers come only from firms that kept the policy, which are presumably the ones where it worked, and in Britain from about 490 workers out of nearly two thousand who answered the first survey. Firms that dropped the four-day week, and workers who left, are not in the chart.
The German pilot of 2024, analysed at the University of Münster, is the one that followed everyone. Forty-five organisations began; two dropped out during the trial for economic reasons; at the end 73 per cent said they would continue. Its comparison group, like Portugal’s, was partly internal: employees of the same firms who did not switch. Against them, four-day workers slept 38 minutes a week more; the fall in sick days was not statistically significant.[13] In February 2026 the researchers went back. Of forty organisations, 70 per cent still reduced hours in some form, but 22 per cent had changed their model, most often because the fixed day off was “too rigid” for day-to-day operations, and 30 per cent had stopped altogether (Figure 3). Those that stopped cited workload peaks and uncertain markets: “we simply could not guarantee reliable delivery with reduced hours during high-demand phases.” Among the workers who answered, burnout was lowest in firms still on reduced hours, higher in those that had stopped and highest in the comparison group, though the authors warn that this “do[es] not permit causal conclusions”.[13]
The strongest design of all is older and smaller. In Sweden, 33 public-sector workplaces were randomly assigned either to cut hours to 75 per cent with full pay for eighteen months or to carry on as before. Compared with the control group, the 354 workers whose hours were cut slept 23 minutes a night longer and reported less stress, and the effects “were maintained over an 18-month period”. They were also small.[14] A Belgian organisation that moved to a 30-hour week in 2019, and was studied with time-use diaries, found work–family conflict down but positive experience of work and general well-being slightly worse, partly because of other changes in the organisation at the same time: the one trial where the job-related measure went the wrong way.[15]
The other much-cited cases are weaker than their reputation. Iceland’s trials of 2015–2019 covered about 2,500 workers but cut at most four hours a week, and in most workplaces one to three; the collective agreements that followed cut 35 minutes in the private sector and 65 in the public.[16] Belgium gave workers the legal right in 2022 to compress a full-time week into four days; by March 2025 fewer than one in a hundred employees used it, which is itself a finding about how much people want compression, as distinct from reduction.[17] Compression has its own history of reversal. The state of Utah put most of its workforce on four ten-hour days in 2008 and abandoned it in 2011, after an audit found that the promised savings had not appeared and residents complained that offices were shut on Fridays. A British training firm dropped a four-day week after two months because staff were “cramming so much work into the four days”.[18]
Finally there is the older evidence from cuts in the legal working week, which is what a national policy would actually be. They do not create jobs. France’s 35 hours had no measurable effect on employment when regions that applied it less strictly are compared with the rest; Japan’s reduction in the 1990s cut hours without cutting monthly pay and created no jobs; Portugal’s own reduction from 44 to 40 hours in 1996 left monthly earnings about the same, reduced job separations and made workers already under 40 hours somewhat more likely to lose their jobs.[19] They do make people a little more satisfied. Comparing workers affected and unaffected by the French and Portuguese reductions, satisfaction with job and with leisure rose by between 0.07 and 0.15 of a standard deviation, small but robust.[20]
Put together: the well-being gains of a shorter week are real, mostly persist for a year in the firms that keep it, and are smaller once a comparison group is subtracted. Job satisfaction is the gain that fades most. Between one firm in ten and three in ten give it up within two years, usually for reasons of workload and market rather than because workers wanted to go back. And no study with a proper comparison group runs beyond two years.
What the fifth day is for
The second half of the question in the earlier essay was about meaning: whether a shorter week changes workers’ sense of what their job is for. The Duty to Work argued that the centrality of work in a life is a social product, instilled and enforced, and one might expect a four-day week to loosen it, by giving people a day a week in which they are not defined by the job. Or one might expect the opposite: that a job which gives you a day back becomes a better job, and matters more.
None of the trials was designed to tell. The Portuguese final report contains no item on the meaning or purpose of work, its centrality, or identity; the British and pooled international surveys measure burnout, satisfaction and health, not how important work is in a person’s life. The question the European Values Study has asked since 1981, “how important is work in your life?”, has never been put to the same workers before and after their hours were cut.[1][12] What follows is circumstantial, and it points both ways.
Start with what people did with the day. In Portugal, the largest shares said they spent more time with family, 64 per cent, on looking after themselves, 58, and on hobbies, 57 (Figure 4). Study and training, culture and sport rose for fewer than a quarter. Volunteering did not rise at all. Second jobs rose marginally, from 15.5 to 17 per cent of workers.[1] The British interviews found the same shape in more detail: the most common use of the fifth day “by far” was life admin, shopping, medical appointments and repairs, which freed the weekend for “genuine leisure”; few people took up anything new.[10] The day off mostly absorbs the unpaid work that the five-day week had pushed into the weekend.
The day is also not entirely the worker’s. In some British firms, doing freelance work on the day off was forbidden: “The idea behind the four-day week is that they rest,” a manager explained, “so no, they cannot get a second job.” Two chief executives said they were disappointed by how little of the free time went to voluntary work and were looking for ways to nudge staff towards it.[10] The employer that gives the day back still has views on what it is for, and the view is often that it is for coming back to work refreshed.
On the job itself, the trials point towards more attachment, not less. Job satisfaction rose, in Portugal modestly, by 4 per cent on a ten-point scale, and in the international trials more; workers’ sense of their own ability to do the job rose; British staff spoke of “shared purpose” and of being proud of their organisation.[1][10] Juliet Schor, who led the international research, summarises the pattern as “they value their jobs more”.[21] The prices workers put on the arrangement say the same thing from the other side. In Britain, 15 per cent said no pay rise would get them back to five days; in Portugal, workers valued the fourth day at 28 per cent of their salary.[1][10] That is attachment to the job with the four-day week in it: exactly the kind of loyalty an employer would want, and an argument for the policy that its advocates make openly.
The employer that gives the day back still has views on what it is for.Autonomy, The results are in, 2023, p. 63
History offers one long experiment, and it is one the earlier essay would recognise. In December 1930 the Kellogg’s cereal plant in Battle Creek, Michigan, replaced three eight-hour shifts with four six-hour ones, and hired 30 per cent more workers. Interviewed by the US Women’s Bureau in 1932, nearly 85 per cent of the women preferred the short shift, and spoke of it as “my own time”, time for family and the community. In 1946, 87 per cent of the women and 71 per cent of the men voted to return to it after the war. But by 1957 only about a quarter of the workforce, mostly women, was still on six hours, and in 1985 the last department voted for eight.[22]
The historian Benjamin Hunnicutt, who interviewed the survivors, reads the decline as cultural. After the war, he writes, “Kellogg’s management tried to convince employees that work was the center of life, important for its own sake”, senior male workers joined them, and the short shift came to be mocked as fit for “weak girls” and “lazy, sissy men”; “this cultural change, rather than economic necessity,” ended it. The economic historian Robert Whaples gives the other reading: the men wanted the extra pay for the consumer goods of the post-war boom, and rising fixed costs per worker, health insurance above all, pushed the company towards longer shifts and fewer people. Both are probably true. What the episode shows is that shorter hours can move the centre of a life outside the job, and that the move can be undone, by wages, by costs and by a culture that is worked on.[22]
The cross-sectional data fit that picture without proving it. In the European Values Study, part-time workers call work very important in their lives much less often than full-time workers: 34 against 47 per cent in the Netherlands, 40 against 54 in Germany, 57 against 63 in France (Figure 5). But they do not call leisure more important; in France they call it less so. The part-timers are mostly women, and the likelier explanation is that care, not leisure, is what competes with the job. The Portuguese sample of part-timers is too small, 28 people, to say anything.[23] Across studies the link between hours worked and work centrality is weak, a correlation of about 0.2, and people who are oriented towards leisure are not more instrumental about their jobs than those oriented towards work: they are less devoted to work as a duty, not more cynical about it.[24] All of this is people choosing their hours, not hours changing people.
France is the natural test of whether a national cut in hours changes the national relation to work, and it has produced a famous number that turns out to be an artefact. It is often said that the share of French people calling work “very important” collapsed from 60 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent in 2022. The first figure is from the European Values Study, a face-to-face survey of all adults; the second from an Ifop survey of employees, with a different method. The same European Values Study question, asked the same way, gives 61 per cent in 1990, 69 in 1999, between the two laws that brought in the 35-hour week, 67 in 2008 and 61 in 2018 (Figure 6). The 35-hour week did not make work less important to the French.[25] What the French surveys of the time did show is that for four in ten employees the reduction made no difference to daily life, because the hours freed were unpredictable, unusable or out of step with their families’. The form of the free time mattered as much as its amount.[26]
So, on the question the earlier essay asked: a shorter week, where it has been tried, seems to make the job liked more and the days outside it fuller, mostly with family and chores. There is no evidence that it makes the job matter less as a source of identity, and some that it binds people to the employer who grants it. There is also no evidence that it does not, because nobody asked. The Kellogg’s story says the answer may take a generation to show, and may depend on what the employer, the neighbours and the wage do in the meantime.
What can be said, and what is still unmeasured
Three things can be said with some confidence. A shorter week, without loss of pay, makes the people who get it less tired, less burned out and more satisfied, and most of that lasts at least a year; the gains are smaller than the advocates’ headlines once a comparison group is subtracted, but they do not vanish. Firms that volunteer can make it work, especially if they reorganise rather than squeeze, and a minority give up when orders rise. And cutting hours by law, the one thing a government can do for everyone, has in Europe improved satisfaction modestly and created no jobs.
Two things cannot yet be said. Whether the Portuguese results hold outside firms that chose to try, because the only comparison group was small and self-selected and the follow-up was never published. And whether a shorter week changes what people think their work is for, because no trial has asked. The earlier essay called that the natural next measurement, and it still is. It would not be expensive: the University of Porto’s case studies and the Azores report are due, the Portuguese pilot firms are known, and the European Values Study question on the importance of work takes ten seconds to answer. Asked of the same workers before a reduction and two or three years after, alongside a comparison group, it would answer the question directly instead of from the edges.
Until then the fairest reading is this. The four-day week has been shown to be possible and good for those who get it, and not yet shown to be generalisable. Whether it loosens the hold of work on a life, or tightens the hold of a good employer on a worker, is a question that the people designing the next trial could choose to answer.
This piece was written collaboratively with Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic): human specification, editorial direction and critical review; machine data research, analysis and drafting. The figures and derived numbers are computed by scripts/fourday.py from values typed in from the primary reports, each with its table or page: the Portuguese final and interim reports and the parliamentary record; the British one-year report; the supplementary tables and peer-review file of Fan and colleagues (2025), whose main text is paywalled and was read only through its abstract; the Münster pilot and follow-up reports; and the European Values Study through the WVS online analysis tool (the microdata were not used). Some Portuguese values are read off the report’s charts, which print only the changes; they carry an uncertainty of about one point, and the text uses the printed changes. The downloaded sources, with a page reference for every number, are kept with the script’s data; results are in docs/fourday-results.json and the figures in docs/fourday-figures.html.
The cover is the banner of the Melbourne eight-hour-day movement, 1856, “8 hours labour, 8 hours recreation, 8 hours rest”, from a contemporary engraving; public domain, via Wikimedia Commons, cropped.
Authored by: Luis Matos Ferreira — Physicist, Developer, Writer
- The Duty to Work — how the centrality of work was instilled, and whose interests it serves.
- Earned and Unearned — the split of income between work and capital, and how each is taxed.
- The Two-Thirds Country — Portugal’s productivity, hours and wages, and the pilot’s first results.
- The Fifteen-Hour Week — Keynes’s prediction, productivity and the hours that were not given up.
- Where the Hours Went — who got the income, what it bought, and where the hours of work go.
- Gomes & Fontinha, Semana de Quatro Dias. Projeto-Piloto. Relatório Final, IEFP, June 2024: pp. 8–13, 25, 37, 42, 71, 88, 104–123, Figs. 3.7, 3.16–3.19, 3.25, Tables 3.2–3.6; and Relatório Intermédio, IEFP, December 2023.
- Vandoros, Barros, Skordis, Burchell, Fontinha & Gomes, “How the four-day working week could affect health”, Nature Human Behaviour 9, 1997 (2025).
- “Semana de quatro dias avança e desafia modelo tradicional”, Jornal Económico, 29 August 2026.
- Instituto de Sociologia da Universidade do Porto, project “Working time reduction: the 4-day work week”, FCT, February 2025–August 2026, project page.
- “Ministra do Trabalho diz que é cedo para avançar com semana de quatro dias”, Público, 28 June 2024; CNN Portugal, 26 June 2024 and 20 October 2024.
- Diário da Assembleia da República, I série, n.º 37 (debate of 4 December 2025) and n.º 38, 6 December 2025, pp. 79–80 (votes on PJR 36, 7 and 353/XVII, PJL 269 and 263/XVII).
- “Reforma laboral: votação”, despacho.pt, June 2026; CNN Portugal, 19 June 2026; ECO, 11 December 2025.
- “Açores iniciam projeto-piloto da semana de trabalho de quatro dias com 400 trabalhadores”, ECO, 2 January 2026; Jornal Açores 9, 30 June 2026.
- PlanAPP, Resultados do inquérito sobre a organização do tempo de trabalho na Administração Pública, 1 March 2024.
- Lewis, Stronge, Kellam, Kikuchi et al., The results are in: The UK’s four-day week pilot, Autonomy, February 2023, pp. 7, 41, 46, 59–64.
- Autonomy, Making It Stick: The UK Four-Day Week Pilot One Year On, February 2024, pp. 17–21 and Table 1.
- Fan, Schor, Kelly & Gu, “Work time reduction via a 4-day workweek finds improvements in workers’ well-being”, Nature Human Behaviour 9, 2153 (2025): abstract, Supplementary Tables 1 and 4, and Peer Review File.
- Backmann et al., The 4-Day Week in Germany: Pilot Study Report, University of Münster, October 2024; Backmann, Hoch, Hüby, Platz & Sinnemann, The 4-Day-Week in Germany: A Follow-Up Two Years After the Start of the Trial, 2026.
- Schiller, Lekander, Rajaleid, Hellgren, Åkerstedt, Barck-Holst & Kecklund, “The impact of reduced worktime on sleep and perceived stress — a group randomized intervention study using diary data”, Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health 43, 109 (2017).
- Mullens & Laurijssen, “An organizational working time reduction and its impact on three domains of mental well-being of employees: a panel study”, BMC Public Health 24, 1727 (2024).
- Veal, “The success of Iceland’s ‘four-day week’ trial has been greatly overstated”, The Conversation, 13 July 2021; Alda & Autonomy, On firmer ground: Iceland’s ongoing experience of shorter working weeks, October 2024.
- Acerta, press releases on the take-up of the four-day week regime, February 2023 and 2025 (data at 31 March 2025).
- Deseret News, 5 September 2011, on the end of Utah’s four-day week; The Telegraph, 21 March 2025, on Opportunity Global.
- Chemin & Wasmer, “Using Alsace-Moselle Local Laws to Build a Difference-in-Differences Estimation Strategy of the Employment Effects of the 35-Hour Workweek Regulation in France”, Journal of Labor Economics 27, 487 (2009); Kawaguchi, Naito & Yokoyama, “Assessing the effects of reducing standard hours: Regression discontinuity evidence from Japan”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 43, 59 (2017); Raposo & van Ours, “How working time reduction affects jobs and wages”, Economics Letters 106, 61 (2010).
- Lepinteur, “The shorter workweek and worker wellbeing: Evidence from Portugal and France”, Labour Economics 58, 204 (2019).
- “A New Way to Work?”, Boston College Magazine, summer 2025, on Juliet Schor, Four Days a Week, Harper Business, 2025.
- Hunnicutt, “The Pursuit of Happiness: The Six-Hour Day at Kellogg’s”, In Context 37, 1994, and Kellogg’s Six-Hour Day, Temple University Press, 1996; Whaples, “Hours of Work in U.S. History”, EH.Net Encyclopedia.
- European Values Study 2017–2020, national samples for the Netherlands, Germany, France and Portugal, items Q1D and Q1E by employment status (X028), through the WVS online data analysis tool, retrieved September 2026.
- Kostek, Work Centrality: A Meta-Analysis of the Nomological Network, MA thesis, Bowling Green State University, 2012; Snir & Harpaz, “Work-leisure relations: leisure orientation and the meaning of work”, Journal of Leisure Research 34, 178 (2002), Table 3.
- European Values Study, France, 1990, 1999, 2008 and 2017–2020, item “importance in life: work”; Bendavid & Baumlin, Focus 234, Ifop, January 2023, p. 2; Bendavid, report for the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 2023, pp. 2–3.
- Devetter, “Vers une nouvelle norme des temps de travail? Temps subis ou temps choisis?”, Formation Emploi 78, 2002, p. 53.
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